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Abstract: Today, more and more authors are involved in researching the economic phenomenon of 
corruption and its impact on many macroeconomic indicators. Nevertheless, transitional surroundings 
have offered a unique opportunity in history to explore the relationship between corruption and 
economic growth in entirely different environment from the one in developed western economies. 
Researching of, at first sight, two unrelated social phenomena gave additional light on the causes of 
economic growth in Croatia. The researching paper also gives Croatian position among ten transition 
EU member countries. The corruption perception index was used as the best measuring method of 
corruption in Croatia and other countries while economic growth was measured by GDP per capita 
instead of growth rates. We explained reasons why we did so. The time period covered by the research 
was from 1999 to 2009 for Croatia and from 1995 to 2009 for ten transition EU member countries. 
Total of 137 cases were evaluated. The researching paper demonstrates the negative impact of 
corruption on economic growth where the strength of its influence is relatively obvious. It is also 
evident that the impact of corruption on economic growth is substantially a direct one and that it takes 
place without a significant time delay. Results for the period of research related to Croatia, more 
closely fit the observed data of other transition countries. Corruption could be an additional 
explanation (certainly not the only one) for low or high level of GDP per capita in Croatia. 
Misunderstanding of all the factors that encourage the economic growth may lead to macroeconomic 
structural misbalances in Croatian economy. 
Key words: corruption, CPI,economic growth, GDP per capita, payoff 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The transition from centrally-planned to a market economy represents a unique period in history which   
offered also  a chance for numerous studies of economic phenomena (not only economic) in 
completely different conditions in relation to the conditions that exist in developed Western countries 
and elsewhere. The transition to a market economy in Croatia did not only mean a change of state 
(social) to private ownership but also involved changing of the whole structure of national economy of 
the former socialist country. The changes do not merely cover the entire Croatian economy but also 
the legal framework, existing institutions, technology and everything else. During initial transition 
period Croatian governments faced with high and variable inflation trends, the decline in economic 
activity, increased unemployment and strengthening of macroeconomic imbalances. It became obvious 
Prethodno priopćenje                      UDK: 330.35:343.352>(497.5)=111 Oeconomica Jadertina 2/2011. 
    
ISSN  1848-1035                                                                                                                                                    86 
that the transition process is slower than initially expected, it has its costs, it is unfair to some 
segments of society, it often deepens the existing economic and social crisis, etc.  
 
Such conditions were different in many respects in relation to social and economic conditions that 
existed in developed countries, and elsewhere. Therefore, they have created a unique opportunity to 
explore the relationship of corruption and economic growth in an entirely new, specific 
macroeconomic environment. We also include in our research the transition countries that have 
become EU members because they passed like Croatia a very similar path during the period of the 
reforms.  
 
The phenomenon of corruption is largely seen through the criminal-legal framework, but its 
manifestation may have far wider significance and it is causally associated with some macroeconomic 
indicators. This paper just aims to expand this view. That is the reason why corruption is treated in this 
paper to a large extent as economic phenomena that exists in a community just like other economic 
phenomena, such as for example economic growth. 
 
It was also necessary to make an adequate choice of methods for measuring corruption among the 
possible options, and explain the reasons for using selected methods for measuring and its 
characteristics. There was a dilemma for measuring economic growth between growth rate and level of 
GDP per capita and we explain it in Section IV. Methods of measuring levels of corruption and 
economic growth are looking for an adequate explanation of the results and at the same time help to 
explain the form of their interconnectedness. The main hypothesis of this research is that higher level 
of corruption in Croatia causes lower economic growth. In order to prove the hypothesis, we used 
linear regression model and cross-country analysis in our investigation.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section I is introduction. Section II summarizes selected literature 
and empiric experience on corruption and economic growth. Section III provides a short overview of 
the development of legal and institutional frameworks for fighting corruption in Croatia. Section IV 
describes methodology and model. Section V discusses statistic data, evaluation and results and 
section VI concludes. 
 
 
2  Brief literature overview and review of empiric experience  
 
We have stressed out that up to now corruption and its effects on society are generally looked only in 
the course of the criminal-law framework. On the other hand, corruption has many comprehensive 
impacts on society and it is connected with numerous other social phenomena. Today, increasing 
number of authors research how corruption impacts on many macro economy indicators. More and 
more economists are included in research of the relationship between corruption and GDP per capita, 
corruption and economic growth rate, corruption and market structure, corruption and investment rate, 
corruption and international trade, corruption and government revenues, corruption and shadow 
economy, corruption and the quality of public infrastructure, corruption and public expenditure 
allocation, corruption and total investment, corruption and foreign direct investment etc. Despite all 
this, analysis of the cause-effect of relationship between corruption and economic growth is still not 
sufficient. It is very important to maintain the low level of corruption for the persistence of high 
economic growth in some countries. Low level of corruption, of course, is not the only reason for 
explanation of high economic growth.  
 
The undesirable impacts of rent-seeking on economic growth have been researched more or less for 
three decades. There is, from time to time, a distinction between corruption and rent-seeking among 
some authors but we explain both in a very similar way. We also stressed out that corrupt businessmen 
and rent-seekers are competent to keep on their relations with corrupt bureaucrats under different 
governments and different parties. The persistence of corruption is a characteristic of many transition 
countries with large economic and political changes.  
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Some authors like Baumol (1990) have given chronological facts on the adverse effect of rent-seeking 
on economic growth. In addition to, he investigated the adverse effect of rent-seeking to the option of 
rent-seeking by the gifted individuals when remuneration structure is in disagreement with production 
and free enterprise. Some other authors like Murphy, Vishny, and Schleifer (1991) brought in their 
researches different levels of increasing revenue to talent persons in production and rent-seeking. They 
gave empirical confirmation supported on the ratio of students from faculties of law and engineering 
in the USA that rent-seeking is to be in compliance with economic growth. Furthermore, Barro (1991) 
and Brumm (1999) also found in their research papers adverse impact of rent-seeking on economic 
growth (and government expenditure). Acemoglu (1995), Mauro (1995) and Baumol (2004) came to 
the conclusion that rent-seeking and corruption encourage one part of national economy to 
unproductive activities. Cole and Chawdhry (2002) strong-minded rent-seeking using the raw numbers 
of interest organizations with permit to lobby in a central administration and the interest organization 
thickness which takes into account  the numbers of organizations with regard to the capacity of each 
economy. They proved that rent-seeking has harmful effects on economic growth, public investment 
and public services. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) investigated situation in Russia, Philippines, and Africa. Authors 
concluded that corruption has adverse effects on economic growth. They also argued that corruption 
might be costly because a weak central administration tolerates bureaucracies to enforce high levels of 
bribes on private businesses. Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997), Sachs and Warner (1997), also 
considered that corruption has negative effect on economic growth. There is very important paper by 
Mauro (1995) in the context of this research because he investigated the relationship between 
corruption and GDP per capita growth in a large cross-section of 68 countries. Mauro proved that 
corruption has negative effects on investment and economic growth. Lui (1996) considered that 
corruption has a positive short-term effect on allocate efficiency and a negative effect on the long-term 
growth rate. Rahman, Kisunko, and Kapoor (1999) investigated how corruption effects on economic 
growth and gross domestic investment in Bangladesh. They concluded that corruption is significantly 
and negatively related with cross-country differences in economic growth and gross domestic 
investment. They also concluded that corruption slows down economic growth by reducing foreign 
direct investment.  
 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) investigated connection among several indicators like trade policy, 
human capital, investment, and political stability with corruption and economic growth. They found 
negative impact of corruption on economic growth, too. Mo, Méon and Sekkat (2005) thought that 
corruption has adverse impact on economic growth wherever a weak rule of law and the inefficiency 
of central administration are present. Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) used a dynamic general 
equilibrium model to examine how corruption impacts on economic growth. Their conclusion is that 
only in the "free” countries the adverse impact of corruption on economic growth became visible. 
Aidt, Dutta and Sena (2008) highlighted the level of institutional quality because corruption has an 
adverse impact on economic growth in countries with high quality institutions only. At the same time, 
economic growth reduces corruption. On the other hand, corruption has no impact on growth in 
countries with low quality institutions.  
 
A number of authors like Mauro (1996), Brunetti (1997), Poirson (1998), Ehrilch and Lui (1999), 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999), Leite and Weidmann (2002) and Gyimah-Brempong 
(2002), Neeman, Paserman and Simhon (2004) and Welsch (2004) used the level of GDP per capita 
growth as dependent variable. They also concluded that there is a significant negative impact of 
corruption on economic growth. Li, Xu and Zou (2000) investigated corruption and how it affects on 
income distribution and growth across 47 countries. Their research paper showed that corruption has 
an adverse impact on economic growth, but its impact is not very significant. Mo (2001) gave 
quantitative calculation and thereafter he concluded that corruption slows down accumulation of 
human capital, investment and political stability. As a consequence of this situation, the result is a 
lower growth rate. Abed and Davoodi (2002) researched cross-sectional data for 25 countries over the 
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period 1994-98. They argued that higher growth is related to lower corruption in transition economies. 
This impact is of no consequence in a segment of structural reform index if it includes the degree of 
government’s failure. Aizenman and Glick (2003) showed estimation with the final result that a falling 
down of corruption by one index point impacts on the rise of GDP by 0.5 percentage points.  
 
Rock and Bonnett (2004) verified the negative relationship between corruption and economic growth 
and between corruption and investment by four different corruption indices. They came to the 
conclusion that corruption is much more destructive to investment and economic growth in small 
against great developing countries. They also found that corruption networks are under control by a 
centralized state in East Asia. Furthermore, East Asian Paradox is the explanation for the positive 
correlation of high levels of corruption and high sustained economic growth in the named region. 
Guetat (2006) investigated situation in the Middle East and North Africa on a sample of 90 countries. 
He found significant negative effects of corruption on economic growth undergoing from bad 
institutions. Islam (2004) eliminated the unobserved fixed effects and reduced the correlation between 
exogenous variables. He concluded that corruption has negative impact on GDP per capita but it is no 
longer significant. Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) thought that there is no direct impact of corruption on 
economic growth. The real fact is that corruption has direct impact on investment, schooling, trade 
policies, and political stability and as a final result there is an indirect impact on economic growth. 
Interestingly, Barreto (2001) considered that there is a positive direct impact of corruption on 
economic growth.  
 
 
3  Development of legal and institutional framework for combating corruption in 
Croatia 
 
After proclaimed independence Croatia inherited legal and institutional framework for fighting against 
corruption from the former state. Economic reforms and transition to market economy have also 
required changing of the inherited legal and institutional framework that was in large part outdated and 
inadequate. Undoubtedly the change occurred during twenty years of Croatian independence was 
significant, but a lot is still to be upgraded.  
 
Although in its essence it is always the same, the phenomenon of corruption passed through different 
forms and manifestation in transition of economic and social system in Croatia. Privatisation of 
formerly socially (state) owned firms has given some individuals and groups the possibility of a large 
enrichment, and on the other hand, a large number of employees of these same companies lost their 
jobs. As opposed to the former social system where private property was limited, in new system it was 
possible to get in an illegal way the property or acquire the ability to manage financial flows of a large 
number of companies. 
 
Inefficient prosecution of perpetrators of corruption acts is largely a result of the slow reform of state 
administration, in relation to the speed of reforms of the domestic economy. Such a situation has also 
contributed by the inadequate training of employees in most of the state institutions which are 
responsible for prosecuting criminal offenders, especially those criminal acts that represent the 
sophisticated forms of corrupt activities. 
 
Corrupt activities are also supported by the fact that employees in state administration and local 
government have a low income. On the other side, some people formally or informally concentrated 
more management functions and decision-making power concerning the transformation of social 
enterprises, obtaining individual licenses for realization of investments, payment of fiscal debts, public 
procurement, etc. Public has been very often informed in the media that the head of a state institution 
has become a member of a political party what encouraged such persons in the future to "give back the 
debt” to those persons who helped him to get a high official position. On the other hand, professionals 
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who work in public administration and local self-government but do not belong to certain political 
parties and interest lobbies have become endangered in a fair performance of their duties.  
 
Motivation of citizens to fight against corruption and provide information about corrupt activities to 
relevant authorities is discouraged by long court proceedings. The author of these lines could 
personally testify the previously mentioned fact, because he personally initiated criminal proceedings 
for many illegal activities in the transformation and privatization of social enterprises, but the court 
proceedings have lasted for ten or even fifteen years resulting with   an absolute suspension for 
criminal prosecution. Unfavourable environment is also contributed by investigative journalism that 
was in its work quite compromised by the fact that some of the media are not privatized in a 
transparent process by capital with dubious origin. Those media came into the ownership of persons 
who are not interested in "taking out someone’s dirty laundry.” 
 
Fundamental institutions of criminal prosecution have remained the same as in the former social 
system like the Ministry of Interior, the State Attorney’s Office and the courts whereby a significant 
support in some segments is given by tax administration, customs administration, etc. Nevertheless, 
these state institutions passed through multiple organizational transformations, changing their legal 
powers, and thereby they have created new organizational units, more or less involved in certain forms 
of criminal prosecution of perpetrators of corrupt activities. In this sense, there were the organizational 
wanderings, lacks of demarcation of responsibilities of some government units for their actions, 
unclear criteria for the appointment of heads of some government departments, etc. As an interesting 
example was the establishment of the Financial Police as a separate organizational unit within the 
Ministry of Finance which responsibilities sometimes overlap with the work of the Tax Administration 
or the police Department for Economic Crime within Ministry of Interior. It was also significant that 
Financial Police was abolished in the period after the change of government in Croatia, but it has been 
again formed with more or less similar powers. 
 
A few years after proclamation of its independence, Croatia has established its regional structure of 
counties (županije). Shortly afterwards Croatia has made "a regional structure” of the Ministry of 
Interior, the State Attorney’s Office and the courts. The Ministry of Interior has formed departments or 
groups to combat economic crime, in which jurisdiction there are also some suppression of corrupt 
offences. It also formed an additional departments or groups to combat against organized crime with 
the responsibility of prosecuting criminal offences such as receiving and giving bribes. In this way 
both organizational units are elevated to a higher organizational level than the former Department of 
Operational Activities from which they were formed. Furthermore, the State Attorney’s Office and the 
courts selected some prosecutors and judges to work on corrupt criminal cases. 
 
The State Attorney’s Office, police and the courts have helped in their work with reorganization of the 
Customs Administration which structure has been reinforced by the new wards with powers of 
customs control inside the national borders, not only on the border lines. Furthermore, the Tax 
Administration has formed special department to combat tax-crimes. The Ministry of Finance has also 
established the Office for Money Laundering Prevention, the Croatian Agency for Supervision of 
Financial Services (HANFA), the State Inspectorate, the Financial Inspectorate, etc. In a broader sense 
some non-governmental organizations for combat corruption, such as Transparency International 
Croatia, Partnership for Social Development, etc could be added to this institutional framework. 
 
However, the overall institutional framework had not an adequate content as a response to the spread 
of corruption in Croatia. Therefore, the public reasonably required more efficient operation of state 
administration in its suppression. European institutions also required better results in fighting against 
corruption activities in Croatia as a precondition for Croatian accession to the EU. Therefore, the 
Croatian government created the National Programme for Combating Corruption and Action Plan for 
Combating Corruption. Soon afterwards, the State Attorney’s Office has formed special professional 
Offices for the Prevention of Corruption and Organized Crime (USKOK) based in regional centres in 
Zagreb, Split, Rijeka and Osijek. The newly formed divisions have not been sufficiently staffed and 
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they didn’t have adequate offices, modern techniques and adequate operational support to implement 
the necessary actions. USKOK mainly depended in its work on existing organizational units of the 
Ministry of Interior and such symbiosis did not give the expected results. So it was necessary to 
establish adequate police departments, which is done by establishing the Police National Office for 
Combating Corruption and Organized Crime (PNUSKOK) with the four regional departments in 
already mentioned regional centres. At the beginning, forming of a new police office did not enhance 
the work of USKOK. However, after the PNUSKOK got better office equipment for its work and 
hired an adequate number of police officers, it began to investigate great corrupt scandals. The result 
of this successful operation was the prosecution of high state officials where the damage amounted to 
tens of millions of Euros. 
 
Criminal law has remained the legislative centre which defines individual criminal acts of corruption. 
In its essence, although in slightly modified form, the understanding of corrupt crimes such as 
receiving a bribe, offering a bribe, abuse of official position or authority, abuse of authority in 
business transactions, etc., which has existed in the criminal law of the former state, has been 
preserved. Nevertheless, the new criminal law changed individual beings of criminal acts and 
introduced new criminal acts in the criminal legislation such as money laundering, bankruptcy abuse, 
abuse of office of state government and others. Without a doubt, they were more appropriate forms of 
illegal behaviour in the market economy. Corrupt criminal determinants described in the Criminal Law 
could be more or less associated with other forms of illegality and it could lead to criminal 
determinants of other laws, for example the Companies Act. 
 
Legislative framework has been improved by the Law on Preventing Conflicts of Interest in Public 
Office and then the Croatian Parliament formed a Commission to Decide on Conflicts of Interest. 
Furthermore, the legislative framework has been complemented by the adoption of the Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption, the Civil Law Convention on Corruption, the United Nations Convention 
on Corruption and the Law on Financing Political Parties. Croatian Parliament also accepted the Law 
on Liability of Legal Persons for Criminal Offences, Law on Witness Protection, Law on Prevention 
of Money Laundering, Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act and the Law on the Access to 
Information. At the same time in 2008. Croatian Parliament accepted the Anti-Corruption Strategy and 
the corresponding Action Plan for its suppression. 
 
Significant reform of legislation regulating the prosecution of corruption offences occurred by 
changing the Law on Criminal Procedure. In this sense, the most important novelty is conducting an 
investigation by the State Attorney’s Office and USKOK what in practice significantly accelerated the 
entire judicial process. Instead of investigating judge, the law introduced a new concept of a judge of 
the investigation. He mainly has the task to monitor the validity of some procedural actions, but he no 
longer carries out any investigation which is known to be very time-consuming and inefficient. The 
law also required a more direct involvement of prosecutors and USKOK from the start of the major 
corruption investigation especially where the investigation would improve new special measures of 
eavesdropping, tracking, simulated bribery and others, which is implemented in practice. Law on 
Criminal Procedure introduces the possibility of investigating corruption scandal by using the witness 
penitent what has been repeatedly essential for the successful completion of the trial. USKOK and 
PNUSKOK have acquired the necessary technical equipment for the implementation of special 
measures for the detection of corrupt activities and they conducted a series of educational seminars 
with practical exercises for training of staff to new working conditions. Significant results in shedding 
light on some corruption scandals have certainly achieved, and the highest state officials have been 
arrested which would certainly be reflected on the perception of public about the level of corruption in 
Croatia. Of course, in some processes that could result with huge damage for local economy, no end is 
at sight still. Moreover, the opening of some corruption scandals is similar to opening of "Pandora’s 
Box.” 
 
The level of corrupt activities in Croatia is also trying to be reduced by the increasing transparency of 
public administration work and by the establishment of the Central State Office for e-Croatia. The ease 
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of coordination among government agencies should be enabled by introduction of a personal 
identification number (OIB).  Let us also mention that the Ministry of Interior introduced a free-
phone’s alarm about corruption, and that significant progress has been made in the Land Registry and 
transparency of the publication of individual property rights because the whole data are now available 
on the internet website. 
 
Despite significant reform of the institutional and legislative framework for combating corruption in 
Croatia, there is still insufficient legal protection of the brave individuals who indicate corrupt 
activities (whistleblower), lack of motivation of public administration employees to fight against 
corruption, negative selection of human resources who work on combating corruption activities etc. It 
is necessary to reorganize and additionally educate judicial employees who work on combating 
corruption crimes, especially those employees who work on combating the sophisticated white-collar 
crime. There is still insufficient transparency in the work of individuals who occupy important 




4  Research methodology and assumptions     
 
Corruption could include various forms like bribery, extortion, nepotism, embezzlement, fraud, insider 
trading and conflict of interest etc. Of course, this thoughtful of corruption may not be the same as the 
explanation of corruption evidencing in the some articles of Criminal Law in Croatia and other 
transition countries. Nevertheless, this idea of corruption notes the heart of problem and therefore a 
valid investigation using the advantage of adequate model for measuring corruption and its impact on 
economic growth could be carried out.   
 
The first question is how do we measure corruption because it is by its nature hidden? Another 
problem to measure corruption is that its outside may give the impression of being wholly legal. 
Whether the established model of measurement will be credible? Each known model has some 
advantages and disadvantages. We could measure corruption only by indirect methods. It is impossible 
to identify all corrupt activities in society because of corruption’s illegality. Therefore, the 
measurement of corruption cannot be mathematically exact. 
 
Almost all known models for the measurement of corruption are based on perception of some 
categories of the population. We could certainly include in such models bribe payers' index (BPI), 
global corruption barometer (GCB) and corruption perceptions index (CPI). They are the best known 
models for the measurement of corruption today. In our research paper we used the corruption 
perceptionindex(CPI)
1
 of Transparency International
2
. This measure in essence calculates the level of 
perception of corruption in the public sector and it is therefore defined as the abuse of public power for 
personal gain. It was calculated from data obtained from the reports of entrepreneurs and 
professionals.  
 
Transparency International publishes an annual data by CPI measures since 1995. Now it is possible to 
have data from 180 countries and territories around the world. All results are founded on 13 sources 
from 10 independent institutions. Each source measures frequency and/or size of bribes and provides a 
status of countries in rank from 0 to 10 points. The highest level of 10 points means that there is the 
lowest level of corruption in country and on the other side 0 points means that country is the most 
corrupted.  
Corruption perception index is measured by the answers obtained from country reputable experts and 
business leaders based on the corresponding average for each country. The result and average are 
                                                          
1 Johann Lambsdorff from University of Passau developed CPI methodology for Transparency International. 
2 International civil organization dedicated to fight corruption supported by government agencies, development organizations, public 
institutions, foundations and individuals 
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calculated for each participant. Resulting problem is different classification because each of the 
sources uses its own scaling system. Of course, there is a solution and different scaling systems are 
standardised in two actions. First of all, the results are denominated in mutually comparable units. This 
technique is called "matching percentiles”.  It is probable that in process of "matching percentiles” 
small amount of information could be lost. Therefore second action is consisted of applying a beta-
transformation for the results obtained. The beta-transformation increases the standard deviation 
among all countries included in the CPI.  Subsequently, every one of the standardised indicators is 
averaged in order to find out a country's level of corruption. Number of evidences, high-low scope, 
standard deviation and confidence range for every country are going together with CPI range. 
Confidence range is established on a 90 per cent range with a five per cent probability that the score is 
under and a five per cent probability that the score is higher than this confidence range.  
 
The average method applied to create the CPI may decrease the measurement mistakes if they are 
independent and identically distribute in different analysis. But in the case when different analyses 
cover diverse parts of the set of countries, the averaging method may initiate another measurement 
mistakes when cross-country rankings are created. If the CPI in different years is drown out from 
possibly different set of analyses, they should not be used to measure changing in corruption rank for 
some countries. However, credibility is kept by the fact that the indices are quite constant over time. In 
addition to, CPI is highly correlated with other corruption measures.   
 
There was dilemma in economic research of whether economic growth measured by growth rate or by 
GDP per capita. Researchers have mostly decided to use an average rate of real GDP growth if it was a 
long period of time. However, we decided to measure economic growth by GDP per capita rather than 
by growth rate because of the shortness of the research period and speed of structural changes through 
which it passed Croatia and compared countries in transition. In recent years, more and more authors 
advocate to use level of GDP per capita in regression rather than growth rate. After all, as noted by 
Hall and Jones (1999), the growth rate anyway affects the level of GDP per capita.  
 
Our linear regression model would look as follows:  
 
log yit = αit + βi xit + εit 
 
where are: 
y – GDP per capita 
x – corruption perception index 
α - constant 
β – regression coefficient 
ε – stochastic variable  
 
If we observe Croatia in the environment of ten transition countries EU members, then the unit of 
observation is i=1,2,...,N, where N=11, and the time period is t=1,2,....,T. Logarithmic value of the 
dependent variable will be used because in this way it balances the pattern and takes into account the 
declining importance of initial conditions. We used the values in international dollars from Pen World 
Tables for the level of GDP per capita. Furthermore, we also use cross-country analysis in our paper. 
 
The assumption of success conducting research was minimum level of liberalization domestic prices 
and abolition of state monopolies in trade, the domestic currency convertibility and liberalization of 
foreign trade, privatization of enterprises, banking reform, etc. Therefore we used cumulative 
liberalization index (CLI)
3
 as the best measure of the market liberalization. CLI should indicate that 
                                                          
3 Calculation procedure is explained in de Melo et al. (1997). CLI is weighted average of the assessed level of liberalization in the internal 
market, foreign trade and privatized economy, and shows the depth of structural and institutional reforms in transition countries. The index is 
the sum of the liberalization of previous years because it is expected that previous reforms have an effect on economic performance in the 
current period 
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the degree of liberalization is greater than two, which means that the market is sufficiently liberalized. 
Most transition countries have implemented reforms after the stabilization programs whereas 
exceptions are Bulgaria and Romania. They have delayed adoption of the stabilization program. 
Exceptionally, the level of the CLI in those countries was above 2 points before their adoption. 
 
Croatia’s Cumulative Liberalization Index was above two during 1992. and amounted to 2.37. CLI 
over two in 1992. had also Hungary (2.43), Poland (2.46) and Slovenia (2.52). Some transition 
countries EU members had CLI above two in 1993. such as Estonia (2.04), Czech Republic (2.74), 
Bulgaria (2.26) and Slovakia (2.64). The rest of observed countries the CLI over two had just during 




5  The statistic data, the evaluation and the results   
 
Research of the impact of corruption on economic growth in Croatia is based on data for eleven years, 
i.e. for the period since 1999. until 2009. Data for the level of corruption in the previous period, 
measured by CPI index, were not available because Transparency International did not publish data for 
that period. Total of 11 cases are evaluated. Of course, this is a small number of data for quality 
evaluation and that is the reason why the impact of corruption on economic growth in Croatia is 
examined in environment of ten transition countries EU members: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Research of the impact of 





. Data for the level of corruption for the initial exploration period is not complete because 
Transparency International did not publish data for all countries. Total of 137 cases are evaluated. 
Data for the 1995
th
 year were related only to Hungary, and for 1996
th
 year only for Hungary, Poland 
and the Czech Republic. We have added Romania to data for 1997
th
 year, etc. All ten transition 
countries (plus Croatia) have been fully covered by the survey since 1999
th
. The results of multiple 
regressions are as follows:  
 
Table 1 Multiple Regression Results for Croatia 
 
  Dependent: Var2                         Multiple R =  0,59481003                          F = 4,927554 
                                       
                                  R2=  0,35379897                                       df =   1,9 
   
No. of cases: 11                             adjusted R2= 0,28199885                          p =  0,053581 
               
                                          Standard error of estimate:  0,048725660 
 
  Intercept:  3,820411725       Std.Error: 0,1258655        t( 9) = 30,353           p =  0,0000 
                                                                                 
           Var1 beta=0,595                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Source: own calculation 
 




 calculated by 
the CPI method is 3.7. It is below half the maximum level of the CPI score, which means that Croatia 
still has higher level of corruption. Croatia has not a satisfactory level of CPI in the period observed 
compared to developed countries. The average level of corruption in Croatia is above the average level 
of corruption in ten transition countries for the observed period. The average value of GDP per capita 




 is 12 627.975 international U.S. dollars and it is also not 
                                                          
4 Source: national legislations and MMF, Till (1995): de Melo et al. (1996)  
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on the level of GDP per capita for developed countries and transition countries EU members. The 
average deviation from the average (standard deviation) for the corruption perception index is 0.45607 
and 1 653.4987 for the GDP per capita. The coefficient of variation for the corruption perception index 
of the observed countries is 12.326%, which means that the standard deviation is less than one third of 
the mean and the indicators reported can be considered homogeneous. The coefficient of variation for 
the GDP per capita is 13.094% which means that the standard deviation is also less than one third of 
the mean and the indicators reported can be considered homogeneous too.  The correlation coefficient 
of corruption measured by the corruption perceptions index and economic growth measured by the log 
GDP per capita was positive and amounted to 0.595 which means that they are much related 
phenomena. Accordingly, we could argue that reducing the level of corruption in Croatia in the given 
time period has a positive impact on the level of economic growth. Indicatively, this impact is 
relatively strong.     
GRAPH 1 CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CROATIA
Y = 3,8204+0,075*x; 0,95 Conf .Int.





























Source: own calculation, Transparency International Annual Report and World Bank 
 
The impact of corruption on economic growth in Croatia has been additionally researched in 
environment of the ten transition countries, EU members, where Croatia should join in the near future. 
The results of multiple regressions are as follows:  
 
Table 2 Multiple Regression Results for Transition Countries EU Members 
 
  Dependent: Var2                         Multiple R =  0,55638962                          F = 60,53016 
                                       
                                  R2=  0,30956941                                       df =   1,135 
   
No. of cases: 137                             adjusted R2= 0,30445511                          p =  0,00000 
               
                                          Standard error of estimate:  0,130281372 
 
  Intercept:  3,719907467       Std.Error: 0,0519067        t( 135) = 71,665           p =  0,0000 
                                                                                 
           Var1 beta=0,556                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Source: own calculation 
The average value of corruption in transition countries EU members in the reference period from 1995 
to 2009 calculated by the CPI method is 4.482482. It is below half the maximum level of the CPI 
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score, which means that transition countries still have higher level of corruption. Transition countries 
have not a satisfactory level of CPI in the investigated period compared to developed countries. The 
average value of GDP per capita in the reference period from 1995 to 2009 is 13 948.17 international 
U.S. dollars and it is also not on the level of GDP per capita for developed countries. The average 
deviation from the average (standard deviation) for the corruption perception index is 0.987711 and 4 
514.464 for the GDP per capita. The coefficient of variation for the corruption perception index of the 
observed countries is 22.035%, which means that the standard deviation is less than one third of the 
average and the indicators reported can be considered homogeneous. The coefficient of variation for 
the GDP per capita is 32.366% which means that the standard deviation is also less than one third of 
the average and the indicators reported can be considered homogeneous too.  The correlation 
coefficient of corruption measured by the corruption perceptions index and economic growth 
measured by the log GDP per capita was positive and amounted to 0.556 which means that they are 
much related phenomena. The correlation coefficient is little bit lower than in Croatia but we could 
also argue that reducing the level of corruption in transition countries EU members in the given time 
period has a positive impact on the level of economic growth. This impact is relatively strong. Graph 
indicates very obvious that richer countries are less corrupt. In addition to, graph provides information 
about the expected level of corruption for a given level of GDP per capita.  
 
GRAPH 2 CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES EU MEMBERS 
Y = 3,7199+0,088*x; 0,95 Conf.Int.

























Source: own calculation, Transparency International Annual Report and World Bank 
 
A characteristic of corruption in the initial period of transition in Croatia is that it has often been 
associated with the privatization process where political insiders were able to purchase state 
enterprises at prices far below market values. There are numerous cases of privatization of state 
enterprises by capital that originated from off-shore companies, shell companies, countries with tax 
havens etc., which have carried a high cost of financial transactions. However, a number of corrupt 
activities relating to public procurement, the granting of concessions, building permits, investment, 
etc., often have direct impact on economic growth. Another characteristic of such impact is that it 
happens without significant time delay.  
 
With respect to the fact that encouraging economic growth is one of the basic tasks of each 
government, it in practice often leads to unilateral view that these task may obtain by almost 
exclusively "classical" economic measures. Today, modern economies and some social phenomena are 
much more connected than yesterday. It also means that the problems cannot be solved by using well-
known existing instruments only. Namely, the "classical” economic instruments needed to be 
complement by the new instruments relating to the interconnected social phenomena. That is why 
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measures to encourage economic growth should be complemented by measures to combat corruption 
in order to be effective.  
 
Nevertheless, an important part of the structure stabilization program in Croatia was provided by 
"classical” economic measures in order to encourage economic growth only. But it doesn’t mean that 
such measures are sufficiently adequate to encourage economic growth and maintain on an acceptable 
level. Unfortunately, it also means that stabilization program has not adequately "identified" the 
economic consequences of corruption or its effects on particular macroeconomic indicators, which 
resulted with the fact that  the stabilization programmes are not properly installed measures to 
encourage economic growth. Such a view on encouraging economic growth could lead to the 
accumulation of disparities in Croatian economies. This situation may flare up at some opportune time 
in the future with the painful macroeconomic consequences. 
 
This indicates the growing need for research into all the circumstances of the macroeconomic 
environment to obtain the results of better quality, closer to the real truth, but also practically useful in 
the effort to complete the economic policies in Croatia.  
 
6  Conclusion 
 
Corruption is so far mainly looked at the criminal-law framework with intent to punish immoral 
individuals. But, the major question is: Does corruption impact on other social phenomena? In the 
centre of our interest we just put a research of prospective impact of corruption on economic growth as 
an important macroeconomic indicator of any economy. We considered that the transition of former 
socialist economy provided an exceptional opportunity for understanding the relationship between 
these two social phenomena. Undoubtedly, conducted research has shown that there is a negative 
impact of corruption on economic growth in Croatia, and the strength of its influence is strong. The 
relation between corruption and economic growth is mostly direct and occurs without significant time 
delay. 
 
Croatia has not incorporated measures to combat corruption in the stabilization programs. Economic 
growth was stimulated primarily by "classical” economic measures. Misunderstanding of all the 
factors that influence the economic growth may lead to structural imbalances in Croatian economy and 
one-sided view that only by economic measures is possible to stimulate economic growth as one of the 
conditions of macroeconomic stability. Moreover, the causes of slow economic growth may remain 
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